Readers are invited to add their names to this letter by following the link to Change.org petition https://www.change.org/p/the-micah-6-8-initiative
To: The Rt Hon Baroness Stowell of Beeston, MBE
Chair of the Charity Commission
102 Petty France
Westminster
London SW1H 9AJ
Tuesday 11 August 2020
Dear Baroness Stowell,
We write as interested parties to ask that the Charity Commission exercise its powers of intervention to address the failures of the Archbishops’ Council of the Church of England (charity number 1074857) to devise a safe, consistent and fair system of redress to all parties engaged in safeguarding complaints. The structures of the Established Church are complex with responsibilities both devolved and diffuse. In addition to 42 Dioceses operating local jurisdiction, there is a National Safeguarding Team (NST), reporting to the Secretary General (William Nye) through a National Safeguarding Director (Melissa Caslake). Policy is devised and guidelines issued by the House of Bishops; there is a Lead Bishop for Safeguarding (currently the Bishop of Huddersfield, Jonathan Gibbs) working with two assistant Bishops (a relatively new innovation) and with further responsibility undertaken by the National Safeguarding Steering Group (NSSG) chaired by the Lead Bishop with its members appointed by the two Archbishops. In addition, there is a National Safeguarding Panel (NSP), “set up to provide vital reference and scrutiny from a range of voices, including survivors, on the development of policy and guidance” with an independent (external) Chair, Meg Munn. The power to suspend under the Clergy Discipline Measure is reciprocally exercised by the two archbishops in cases involving themselves.
There is now some urgency over addressing the impaired transparency and intermittent accountability of the NST. Within such a complex structure, it is extraordinarily difficult for aggrieved parties to secure redress of individual grievance, for questions to be raised, or for policy and its implementation (or lack thereof) to be challenged. We address our complaint to the Archbishops’ Council as the body with ultimate responsibility, established by the National Institutions Measure 1998. It is accountable to the General Synod but is not subordinate to it. In effect, it acts as the national executive of the Church of England.
We are writing as, despite raising significant questions over policy and practice, there is only a nominal institutional acceptance of the need for reform. True, there is now a process underway for a replacement of the widely discredited Clergy Discipline Measure 2003, and the final report of the Independent Inquiry into Child Sexual Abuse (IICSA) into the Anglican Church is awaited. However, the continuing flow of cases of injustice leads us to seek early intervention from the Charity Commission. We do this with reluctance, having tried and failed to secure redress through multiple complaints across the structure.
The signatories to this letter come from a wide range of backgrounds, and all are people with interest in and experience of the current system, policies, and culture within the Church. They include aggrieved complainants, respondents, lawyers, members of the General Synod, clergy, laity and the contributing authors to the book Letters to a Broken Church (published in July 2019) which collected a range of essays exploring the many ways the current system fails all involved.
Much of the discontent centres upon the secretive world of the National Safeguarding Team (NST) core groups, which act in ways reminiscent of the Star Chamber, synonymous with the selective use of arbitrary unaccountable power, concentrating effective control of process in the hands of a very few, who exercise wide-ranging discretions afforded by guidelines devised by Church House administrators and issued by the House of Bishops. Such discretion includes ignoring those very guidelines. Even then, these guidelines are demonstrably inadequate, and are not applied consistently, fairly, or impartially. Whilst the core groups are not independently advised by lawyers experienced in good safeguarding practice, there is the omnipresence of communications advisors, sometimes more than one. The deepest suspicion of those subjected to this process, and many taking an outside observer’s interest, is that these are bodies that function as quasi-judicial adversarial proceedings without the requisite checks and balances of due process, failing all tests of natural justice, and which prioritise the reputation of the Church above common standards of natural fairness.
This letter is prompted by the processes exposed in three current cases. We do not take a view on the individual merits or outcomes of these, but refer to them as typical, representative indicators of the arbitrariness of how the system malfunctions. These case have revealed the following:
1. There is an absence of a properly constituted appeal or review procedure at any stage of the process. No matter how egregious the failures to abide by the Church’s own rules or basic principles of law and good practice may be, there is no remedy.
2 . There is an absence of a comprehensive conflicts of interest policy and, in its absence, an unwillingness to exercise available discretions in the selection guidance and management of the core group membership, so as to ensure a fair and unbiased process throughout their deliberations. A simple illustration suffices. A legal firm may act as advisors to a Diocese which may ultimately play a part in concluding a case, and may simultaneously act for a complainant, but not a respondent. This is currently happening with no institutional awareness of impropriety or willingness to resolve such blatant conflict of interest. The right to a fair trial and preservation of a degree of “equality of arms” are both observed in the breach.
3. When institutional jurisdiction is in question, the Church asserts jurisdiction, but does not explain its reasoning in matters of complex and obscure law. It is unfair to place responsibility for test-case litigation on an individual when the problem lies with the institution. The decision as to who is, and who is not, within the Church’s jurisdiction appears to be arbitrarily and selectively applied without the principles upon why such distinctions are drawn being convincingly advanced for scrutiny.
4. When there have been breaches of the Church’s own rules designed to ensure procedural fairness, there has been secrecy and reluctance to acknowledge error. Thus, in the Dean Percy case, the absence of proper minute-taking has been obfuscated and glossed over. A core group met on 13 March 2020, but no one was designated as a minute-taker. The complainants have received the ex post facto notes created three months later, whereas the Dean is refused even redacted copies. When a replacement Chair of the core group was appointed, she was the undisclosed professional referee for the Investigator.
5. There has been inconsistency and arbitrariness in the way persons were admitted to or excluded from presence or representation at core groups. Thus, three complainant dons from Christ Church, Oxford (none of them primary victims or witnesses of alleged abuse) attended the Dean Percy core group meeting on 13th March, whereas the victim complainant known as “Graham” was neither invited to attend nor attended the core group considering his complaint against the Archbishop of Canterbury, nor was he told it was being convened. This is perceived as selective and privileged access.
6. Having expended charitable monies on independent reports to make recommendations on safeguarding practice, for the benefit and safety of complainants and respondents alike, and having accepted the recommendations thereof, there has been a longstanding failure to make timely changes by the implementation of rule revision, protocol, or any other practical means to put right the historic failures and malpractices which have continued. Thus, all but one of the recommendations of the 2017 Carlile Review into the Bishop George Bell case were accepted, but not implemented; and the process errors are still replicated at this time in current cases. Lord Carlile has recently opined:
“I do not believe that the Church has got to grips with the fundamental
principles of adversary justice, one of which is that you must disclose the
evidence that you have against someone, and give them an equal opportunity to
be heard as those making the accusation.
“And you cannot give them an equal opportunity if there are conflicts of interest
involved. Anyone with a conflict of interest must leave the deliberations and take
no further part. This is what lawyers understand as the law of apparent bias. It’s
not to say that such people are biased: that’s often misunderstood. It is the
appearance of bias that matters.
“Having people on a core group with a conflict of interest is simply not
sustainable and is, on the face of it, unlawful.
“And to fail to allow the person accused to represent themselves, or be
represented, in the full knowledge of the accusation, is not sustainable, and is,
on the face of it, unlawful.”
7. There is a regime in which partiality, privilege and reputational management have taken precedence over due process and proper standards appropriate to an adversarial quasi-judicial process. Thus, the 84-year-old Lord Carey had his Permission to Officiate (‘PTO’) summarily revoked in June 2020 within days of historic information arising (relating to events over 30 years ago), and the press notified, whereas the newly chosen Archbishop of York retained anonymity from the outset of process until a benign judgement was announced. We take no position on the justice of the outcome but highlight the contrast which brings the Church and its systems into disrepute though a perception of bias and privilege.
8. When unfairness and breaches of principles of natural justice and human rights legislation have been brought to the attention of those charged with the responsibility to manage fair and proper process, there has been a refusal to set aside bad process and a prioritisation of “saving face” rather than a willingness to rectify error and restore proper process.
Any one of the above reasons is serious to those adversely affected by the Church’s longstanding poor practice in this field. Collectively and cumulatively it is a picture of ongoing injustice. The institutional strategy persistently to ignore or deny the serious character of these deficiencies falls well below what is expected of the Established Church, and the failure of Archbishops’ Council to call those with operational responsibility to account represents an important dereliction of trustee duties.
Many of those affected or potentially affected are significantly conflicted. At the recent ‘virtual’ meeting of the General Synod (on 11 July 2020) we learnt that there are 27 extant NST core groups. We understand that they relate to complaints against senior clergy, namely bishops and cathedral deans. Some, undoubtedly, will relate to currently-serving diocesan bishops. Virtually all the CDM complaints against the episcopacy of which we are aware result in “no further action” in the cases of currently serving bishops. Those no longer in office seem less protected. It is probably fair to say that there is a powerful disincentive to speak publicly for reasons of collegiality and self-interest. Those who manage the processes within the administration defend reputation and the retention of the powers they de facto exercise. Yet, those of us who have campaigned for reform are often privately urged to “keep doing what you are doing”.
These problems need resolving and the ongoing replication of the same errors in current cases lead us to the reluctant conclusion that outside intervention is now needed, and so we come from many perspectives, many experiences, and many parts of the Church to ask that you intervene to mandate the Archbishops’ Council of the Church of England to account for its failure to rectify serious errors or manage these processes in the interests of justice towards complainants and respondents alike. The risk of not doing so is that this charity sector as a whole will suffer, and that the egregious failures of safeguarding practice and protocol, with the Archbishops’ Council over the NST, will affect churches and charities across the land, causing further and significant collateral damage.
Yours sincerely,
David Lamming Member of General Synod; Barrister (retired)
Martin Sewell Member of General Synod; Child Protection Solicitor (retired)
Lord Carlile of Berriew CBE, QC
Lord Lexden
His Honour Alan Pardoe QC
Sir Jonathan Phillips KCB
Prof Sir Iain Torrance President Emeritus of Princeton Theological Seminary KCVO, Kt
Prof Nigel Biggar Regius Professor of Moral and Pastoral Theology, University of Oxford
Prof Linda Woodhead Lancaster University; contributor to ‘Letters to a Broken Church’
Revd Jonathan Aitken
David Pearson Founder of thirtyone:eight – Christian Safeguarding Charity
Mike Hames Former Detective Superintendent and Head of the Paedophile Unit at Scotland Yard
Gilo Co-editor of ‘Letters to a Broken Church’ ; IICSA core participant; ‘victim of the NST’
Christina Rees CBE Contributor to ‘Letters to a Broken Church’; member of General Synod 1990-2015; founding member of the Archbishops’ Council
Andrew Carey ‘Victim of the NST’
Dr Ruth Hildebrandt Historian and freelance writer
Grayson
David Mason Former Assistant Diocesan Secretary, Lincoln and Governance and Administration Manager, Chichester
Lizzie Taylor
Prof John Charmley Pro Vice-Chancellor Academic Strategy & Research, St Mary’s University
Revd Simon Talbott Member of General Synod
‘A Survivor’ Survivor of sexual assaults by the Revd Meirion Griffiths
Richard Scorer Head of Abuse Law, Slater & Gordon, solicitors; contributor to ‘Letters to a Broken Church’
Revd Valerie Plumb Member of General Synod
Rt Revd Alan Wilson Bishop of Buckingham; contributor to ‘Letters to a Broken Church’
Graham Sawyer ‘Victim of Peter Ball, the NST and the Church Establishment’
Revd Stephen Heard
Simon Barrow Director of ‘Ekklesia’
Revd Stephen Trott Member of General Synod
Revd Paul Benfield Member of General Synod; synodal secretary of the Convocation of York
Margery Roberts Secretary of the Society of the Faith
Revd Canon Angela Tilby Canon Emeritus of Christ Church Cathedral, Oxford
Julian Whiting ‘Victim of the NST’
Simon Sarmiento Editor, ‘Thinking Anglicans’ blog
Rev. Janet Fife, survivor of Rev. X and the NST’.
‘Graham’ Iwerne Trust/John Smyth survivor; ‘victim of the NST’
Andrew Chandler Professor of Modern History at Chichester University; Biographer of Bishop George Bell.
Revd Canon Rosie Harper Member of General Synod; contributor to ‘Letters to a Broken Church’; Co-author of ‘To Heal not to Hurt’
Dr Janet Lord Bishop Whitsey and NST survivor; contributor to ‘Letters to a Broken Church’
Rev. Mark Carey, respondent, and victim of the NST’.
Revd Dr WS Monkhouse
Revd Matt Ineson Victim of the Revd Trevor Devamanikkam, CofE bishops and the NST
Revd Nathan Ward
Revd Stephen Parsons Editor, ‘Surviving Church’ blog
Kathryn Tucker Member of General Synod
IICSA core participant Victim of Bishop Peter Ball and the NST
‘AN 87’
Tina Ney Member of General Synod
Andy Morse Victim of Iwerne Trust/John Smyth QC
Revd Peter Ould
Dr Josephine Anne Stein Contributor to ‘Letters to a Broken Church’
Dr Tom Keighley, Clergy victim of the NST PhD, FRCN
April Alexander Member of General Synod
Dr Adrian Hilton Chairman of the Academic Council, the Margaret Thatcher Centre
Jane Chevous Survivor of clergy abuse by two bishops; founder of ‘Survivors Voices’ – survivor-led peer support
Dr Gavin Ashenden Former chaplain to HM The Queen; now supporting victims of abuse and maladministration
Very Revd Michael Sadgrove Dean Emeritus of Durham Cathedral
Philip French Member of General Synod
Kate Andreyev Clergy wife
Revd Andrew Foreshaw-Cain Chaplain, Lady Margaret Hall, Oxford
Revd Dr Carrie Pemberton Senior Fellow, Ethics and Public Life,-Ford Margaret Beaufort Institute of Theology
David Greenwood Head of Child Abuse Compensation Team, Switalskis Solicitors
Janet Garnon-Williams CPS prosecutor (retired)
Richard Symonds The Bell Society
Revd Canon Dr Robin Gibbons Ecumenical Canon, Christ Church Cathedral, Oxford
Sue Atkinson Writer; survivor; member of ‘Survivors’ Voice’
Rt Revd David Atkinson Assistant Bishop in the Diocese of Southwark; supporter of ‘Survivors’ Voice’
John Tasker Lay Worker in the Church of England
Dr Peter Owen Member of the Church of England
A Survivor ‘A survivor of Diocese of Chichester abuse
I can’t sign it under my nom de plume, and I can’t see anywhere to comment!
At the very, very bottom of the petition, after the full list of the original signatories, is a note which appears to allow you to sign privately by name or pseudonym, with other T&C.
I did try!
Right at the top, opposite ‘to a’ in Letters to a Broken Church’, there’s box where you can sign and comment.
Found the box, I had to turn my tablet round, it was off screen! But I did find it before. It won’t accept a one word name. And what would it win? And no box to comment in. Sigh!
I have been following this story in Private Eye (which might be George Orwell’s fictional Highchurchman’s Hazette) and I agree there is a serious problem with the investigation process leading to different standards in judging those who are accused. The case against the Dean of Christ Church Oxford (college and cathedral) seems more to do with bullying the dean by his fellow dons than any accusation of abuse or failure of safeguarding.
nomorenstinjustice@gmail.com will receive names of those wishing to privately sign the letter: additional names will be sent on to Baroness Stowell.
The email will not be used for separate correspondence and will not be shared with anyone.
Many thanks for this link, which I have used (Gilo kindly wrote me about this recently, but I was being technologically inept).
Thank you also for all your efforts in relation to this matter. I am of the view that the Church should be stripped of all safeguarding functions (other than the duty to report promptly), such that neither its bishops nor its own courts would have any ability to exercise jurisdiction except in a nominal sense.
Instead, what I would like to see is a national safeguarding agency, funded partly by Treasury and partly by a proportionate levy all organisations having contact with children, vulnerable adults or other people who would be covered by existing (or prospective) safeguarding principles. This agency needs to be fully independent of the Church, to avoid regulatory capture, hence the need for its funding base to be diffused.
Such an organisation would have an investigatory arm, and a judicial arm, each with appropriate powers. The agency would be able to impose fines, restrictions on the ability of those within the investigated organisations to conduct their duties (and to ban), or to refer cases to the CPS. The agency would therefore, for example, have the ability to order the ecclesiastical authorities to remove or restore a PTO, or to require them to deprive a member of the clergy or his or her orders (though the agency would not actually effect the deprivation). The Church would be bound to obey on pain of swingeing fines.
Legislation establishing such an agency could be modelled in part on that for OFCOM, the FCA, the ICO, etc., or other public bodies having investigatory powers and quasi-judicial authority. I have it in mind that the agency would be subordinate to the Home Office and/or to the MOJ.
I simply do not believe that the Church can be trusted with any part of the safeguarding process, and that this endless litany of blunders will continue for as long as it does have charge of the process.
Froghole: Under your proposed scheme who would provide pastoral care to victims? Surely the Church must retain some role, indeed duty, in this. However, one can see that there could still be continuing possible issues of loyalty. Would pastoral care operate totally independently of your safeguarding proposals?
Do you envisage the ‘judicial arm’ being staffed or supervised by, e.g., a High Court judge, possibly of the Family Division? Would there be a duplication of jurisdiction? Some of your proposals are already within the Family Division’s jurisdiction. Isn’t there also possible overlap with the functions, and statutory duties, of local authority social services and children’s departments? They seldom, if ever, seem to figure in discussion of these issues.
Under the existing CDM, which is under review, the Bishop has the power to remove convicted clergy from office. I’m not sure that jurisdiction to instruct him to do so should be given to an outside body. Of course there will be problem ‘borderline’ cases. What standard of the burden of proof would you consider to be appropriate?
I hope this doesn’t seem negative. I think it deserves further thought.
Since it is the Bishop who gives, or witholds, a licence or a permission, I think there would be legal issues in instructing him/her.
Many thanks. What I had in mind is that the agency would make a determination in its judicial capacity. The agency would then direct the bishop to remove or restore a licence or PTO. If the bishop refused, the agency would have the power to issue a mandatory order (formerly a writ of mandamus) requiring the bishop to obey or be held in contempt.
In other words, bishops should not be allowed to hide behind ecclesiastical law (or any confusion between ecclesiastical law and any statute establishing the agency) in order to protect or persecute certain individuals.
I appreciate that some bishops may fight a rearguard action to defend their disciplinary discretion, but I feel that the time for such arguments is well past, in view of the discredit into which the current system has fallen. If bishops wished to mount a credible defence of their powers, then they ought to have exercised them better than they have.
I can also see some bishops arguing against the intrusion of the civil power into the affairs of the Church, as if prompting some bogus theory of equivalence between Church and State (an equivalence which has never existed in this country, at least since the days of Boniface VIII’s doomed Unam Sanctam of 1302). Again, if they wished to have avoided the intrusion of the civil power they ought to have created and managed a system which was not so susceptible to failure and, again, that time has passed.
Some clergy might also argue that if the state is going to intrude in this way, then there should be disestablishment (as per the Gorham judgment of 1850 or the cases following the Public Worship Regulation Act 1874). However, I would envisage the agency having these powers irrespective of there being any disestablishment, and that they would apply to other confessions.
Perhaps if a case touched on Islam and the behaviour of one of the ulema, say, the judicial arm of the agency making the decision would have an assessor from the Muslim Council of Great Britain sitting on the applicable panel.
Disestablishment would be fine by me, although I would be sad to see the “every blade of grass” policy go. But it would possibly prevent some of abuse of clergy that arises from their not being employees. But it would take forever, because of endless discussions about who would take care of Grade 1 listed buildings, where would churches meet (lease back?), and who pays what to whom? So if we want things sorted, no disestablishment just yet.
Many thanks. I drafted a bill for disestablishment and disendowment in 2016-17, which dealt with the buildings. In a nutshell: (i) the Commissioners would lose £6 billion out of their £8.7 billion endowment; (ii) that money would be vested in an agency of DDCMS; (iii) title to most of the buildings would pass to the agency, which would then maintain them for public benefit and worship in perpetuity; (iv) the Church would get a perpetual free right of use to the vested stock; (v) there would be an emphasis on parallel uses of the vested stock, where possible, subject to an appeals system; (vi) all remaining parochial and diocesan assets would be vested in the Commissioners to compensate them for the disendowment; (vii) the dioceses would be reduced to purely pastoral agencies, with all administration being centralised; and (viii) the Church would be disestablished as political cover for transferring the contingent liability to the state. However, the state would have the stock as an asset, but one whose costs would be neutralised by the dowry from the Commissioners. The bill was modelled on the 1905 French law of separation, the disestablishment legislation for Ireland and Wales (1869 and 1914), the Church of Scotland Acts 1921 and 1926 and the National Heritage Act 1983. The object would be to prevent the privatisation of the buildings resulting from demographic collapse, and to realise economies of scale in the maintenance of the stock and the management of the Church which a plethora of tired and ageing PCCs and 42 dioceses will never realise. Similarly a single safeguarding agency should itself realise economies of scale and a relative consistency in performance which 43 unevenly funded Church safeguarding bodies cannot achieve.
As far as the safeguarding agency is concerned, clergy would be deemed to be employees over whom the ecclesiastical authorities have control, even if those clergy are office holders and/or are not in receipt of a stipend. They would still be deemed to be the responsibility of the Church. They would only cease to be so if they resigned their benefice or orders under the 1871 legislation or Canon C1 (2). Similarly, the Church would also be deemed to be responsible for any layperson holding office within the Church (whether as an official, reader, pastoral assistant, youth worker, churchwarden, treasurer or PCC member), save unless the act associated with the safeguarding issue in question could not reasonably have be viewed as having any association with the work of that person as part of the Church.
Mr Wateridge,
Many thanks for these comments. They are, as always, very helpful.
The Church should provide pastoral support, as it ought to do so in any case. However, if a victim does not trust the Church the agency could provide, or procure the provision, of support.
I would envisage the agency either having its own judges (as per the immigration system) or co-opting judges from the High Court. Certainly, I think it should be chaired by a senior member of the judiciary, as per the Law Commission (for example). You mention local government; in view of the financial stress under which many local authorities now labour, I wonder whether they might prefer the establishment of a separate agency, in some instances, as the creation of a central agency financed by a range of bodies could create certain cost efficiencies.
The burden of proof should be as it is outside the much-criticised CDM process (i.e., innocent until proven otherwise), and the legislation which I was ruminating would override any ecclesiastical law as a matter of course (N.B., I am somewhat Erastian, and the survival of ecclesiastical law as a species of public law, or of ‘courts Christian’ following the abolition of their matrimonial and testamentary jurisdictions in 1858 has rather been a matter of happenstance).
In addition, I got the impression that IICSA was thinking of some sort of separate agency.
Also, I must stress that these thoughts – or ruminations – are at a very early stage of gestation, and it is possible (indeed, highly likely) that others will have some much better ideas – including yourself, of course.
I wish you were in charge
I’ve sent a note to Martin’s email.
Guardian on line has a news item on this.
Whilst fully in sympathy with all who are in anguish over the mess that the Church of England is in over this contemporary matter I would want to caution greatly the inclination to hand over any supervision to the state or quasi-state bodies.
Although different the position of the national Church in Scotland which ended in the Great Disruption of 1843 has much to contribute to this debate. The wikipedia article is as good as any for those who wish to pursue it.
https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Disruption_of_1843
The issue then was on patronage and whether the lay patron had the right to insist on the ordination of those whom they presented to a parish. A case in Auchterarder arose where the Presbytery was unwilling to ordain a candidate in view of the resistance of the members of the parish. The Patron pursued his right through the Court of Session and eventually to the House of Lords where the ruling was in his favour. The Court of Session had ruled that the established Church was a creation of the State and derived its legitimacy by Act of Parliament.
This led to years of dispute and eventually to the disruption where a third of the Church walked out of the General Assembly to institute its own freedom from the State.
The Church of England is the author of its own mess and it needs to sort it out itself. If power over it is given and retained by the state it sets a dangerous path for the future. Would we become an Ecclesiastical Hong Kong ? By “sorting it out itself” I would want to add without rule of clergy and prelacy but that would take a big leap I know.