One of the features of becoming an incumbent in the Church of England is the fact that you have to become knowledgeable in a variety of areas that were, in my day, barely mentioned at theological college. The world of finance, money raising, legal protocols and the preservation of ancient buildings are not areas of knowledge where clergy have much instruction or can claim any special expertise. This is particularly true if, like me, they have not been in the world of work before ordination. If a vicar is fortunate, he/she will find competent lay people to assist in such tasks. Having sound reliable lay officers in a parish situation is an enormous bonus, but it cannot always be taken for granted. If we were to complain that the average vicar is forced to accept responsibility for areas where he/she can claim no special skill, the problem gets more pronounced as you go up the hierarchy. I spoke in a recent blog piece about the importance of a vicar getting on well with volunteers that work in a parish church. There might be up to twenty such individuals working in a medium size congregation. When you consider a cathedral, the number of volunteers at work may be in the hundreds. In an organisation like a cathedral, if smooth functioning is to be achieved, considerable personnel/management skills are required of those in charge.
The administrative tasks of very senior clergy in the Church of England are, in comparison to ordinary vicars, enormously demanding. A glimpse of the full range of skills needed for a senior bishop, such as the Bishop of London, was revealed to me in some detail when I read Bishop Chartres’ Lambeth Lecture for 2015. Obviously, part of the skill of successful management involved delegating many tasks and responsibilities to other clergy and lay officers. The really important decisions still fell to the Bishop himself and many were to do with strategy and buildings. We read, in the lecture, of the decisions that had to be made over redundant church buildings and vicarages. The financial implications of holding on to a church building in a state of disrepair were potentially crippling. Equally, releasing a piece of potentially valuable real estate in a city like London for less than its market value would also damage the church financially. The Bishop needed help in these kinds of matters. The nitty gritty of sorting out property deals and seeing the potential of buildings was not one to be placed on a bishop’s shoulders. Like a vicar having to deal with an area of administration for which he had no previous experience, Bishop Chartres looked for help. In his own words, he said ‘Part of the answer was a partnership with a remarkable layman, Martin Sargeant, who had an eye for development possibilities and enjoyed considerable respect from the City Corporation and developers alike. His negotiating skills and attention to detail were also crucial in turning ideas into profitable ventures where both the Diocese and a range of Christian-based enterprises were benefited’.
Sargeant began working for Bishop Chartres in 1997. At first he was used as a go-to consultant for property matters, but his place in the Diocese was made official in 2009 when he acquired the title of Head of Operations. It appears now, according to the recently published Review by Chris Robson on the Fr Griffin affair, that Sargeant, in fact, had no defined place within the formal structures of the diocese. The reviewer could not find any contract or conditions of employment. Even the sources of finance from which his salary had been paid were wrapped up in mystery. It seems that Bishop Chartres had become dependent on Sargent for his range of skills in such a way that the protocols of due diligence were cast aside when the full-time appointment as Head of Operations was created for him. To bring this story right up to date, Sargeant, on the 8th July, has been charged in connection with a fraud case involving a missing £5 million. Some of this money belongs to parishes in the Diocese of London. Even if Sargeant is still allowed the presumption of innocence until proved guilty, it is hard to see how so much money could vanish without him having some knowledge of what had happened to it. Clearly, we recognise now that, at the very least, the former Bishop’s trust in his property/financial ‘fixer’ had been grossly misplaced.
The now ex Head of Operations in the Diocese of London also plays a prominent part in another tale of London diocesan woes. Although he is not named, Sargeant is an important figure in the story uncovered by Hobson’s 49-page lessons learned review of the Fr. Griffin affair. The infamous ‘brain dump’ that took place during 2019 between Sargeant and the Archdeacon of London and others, was the start of the disastrous series of events leading to Fr Griffin’s suicide in November 2020. Sargeant wanted to share information that he had picked up in the course of his work in the Diocese over twenty years. This included personal information about the clergy, including Fr Griffin. Some of this information was factual but much was salacious gossip. The details of what went wrong and the way that mishandling of sensitive information was to have so serious an effect on the state of mind of a priest, is set out in Hobson’s review. The point that I wish to focus on here is when the reviewer queries the Archdeacon’s competency in safeguarding matters. The answer he gives is that the Archdeacon was a ‘generalist’ in these matters. At a second meeting with Sargeant, the Archdeacon was accompanied by the Head of Safeguarding who was also the Human Resources lead. Once again, the reviewer questions whether there was in the room sufficient expertise in safeguarding matters to recognise the implications of receiving material of this kind. Nine hours of testimony from Sargeant was received and this was in the end written up to form the Two Cities Report. The process of scrutinising all the information by safeguarding professionals in both the Anglican and Catholic churches was eventually achieved, but the whole process took an inordinately long time. Trust between the clergy mentioned in this report and the current Bishop of London has been seriously damaged by the ill-coordinated management of this material.
The theme of this blog piece has turned out not to be about the safeguarding failures in the London diocese that contributed to Fr Griffin’s death. It is rather about the difficulties experienced by senior church figures in coping with areas of institutional complexity which go beyond their experience and competence. Bishop Chartres seems to have been an enormously able and respected bishop of London, presiding over the only diocese in England to record a growth in numbers in recent years. This apparent super-competency, however, had its limits. He put his personal trust in a property/financial ‘expert’ and the consequences of that trust seem to have been disastrous for the diocese, both reputationally and financially. The fact that the selection seems to have been informal and outside the normal protocols of recruitment, made it his personal choice. This also hints at the possibility that Chartres was well aware of the controversial nature of the appointment and that an open system might not have approved this hiring of someone apparently answerable to him alone.
In the second case we have the Archdeacon of London possessing, according to Hobson’s review, ‘generalist’ skills but being expected to deal with a mass of ‘dumped’ information, giving rise to potentially huge safeguarding and pastoral issues. Going into that meeting with Sargeant, without any clear idea of how he was going to deal with the promised information, was fateful. A clear-eyed response to the sequence of events at this point would be to say that that the Archdeacon quickly got out of his depth and was too slow to reach out to others for the right help and advice.
The recording of two serious errors of judgment by senior members of the London diocese which led to unforeseen but catastrophic consequences, is not meant to be a suggestion that either man is guilty of some deliberate wrongdoing. Both, no doubt, believed at the time they were acting according to the best information available. The real problem was that in each case the skills and expertise for making a correct decision were insufficient. The Church has to take some responsibility for not resourcing its leaders better for these kinds of situations. Property management should never depend on a bishop’s hunch about the (dis)honesty of an individual. There have to be better and more reliable means of managing property and other administrative affairs in a diocese. Ultimately the church would be a healthier place if individuals were better at being aware of the limitations of their skills. At present we place far too many clergy and others in places where they have to make decisions which are sometimes beyond the skills they possess. Is it right that all clergy, from the Archbishop of Canterbury downwards, have to take responsibility for so many complex decisions, whether over finance or safeguarding? Would we not prefer it if our bishops sometimes admitted that they did not know the answers to questions put to them? Do we really want them to depend on their finite abilities or go running off to take legal advice every time someone challenges their authority? We have to admit that, as much as we would like bishops in the CofE to take charge of so many policy issues In their dioceses, it is sometimes demanding of them skills and expertise which many of them simply do not have! An extra beatitude should be added to those that already exist. Blessed are they who know their limitations!
It is pretty clear that Bishops and senior clerics are mikes out their depth. The problem is they won’t admit that. The CofE cannot afford to pay for high-spec officers, which leads to a culture of nice, well-meaning but low calibre appointees – safeguarding being one example of many.
The CofE needs to look at how other Provinces run, usually with far fewer roles and responsibilities. Many posts created centrally did not exist 20 years ago, and it is hard to see the point of them, let alone value for money, accountability and transparency of operation. But no diocese, nor General Synod, has an effective role of governance and scrutiny.
The Sargeant debacle is not atypical. How does William Nye get to reply on behalf of Archbishops’ Council without consulting them? When was the last time ex gratia payments made by a Bishop to hush up incompetence or abuse were disclosed transparently? Do members of Archbishops’ Council have any sense of their role as trustees, with responsibility for audit, scrutiny and accountability?
Sargeant – if proven guilty – has only exploited an unaccountable and entirely non transparent operation. The lack of regulation suits Bishops who do not want their authority or the exercise of their mercurial and inconsistent powers to be subject to external audit, scrutiny and challenge. It is inevitable that any Diocese will then simply embody the character of the person in role into the flesh of the institution. If Bishops don’t submit to external authority and regulation, Dioceses will mirror that. Sargeant Episodes will therefore be repeated.
In the secular sphere, this is why MPs and the Cabinet eventually turned on Boris. They understood that his personal inhabiting of the role – scant regard for accountability, truth, etc – is what the government would become. And perhaps even Parliamentary and democracy. Boris’ contempt for his own regulations with Partygate was especially egregious.
Are the CofE better than Boris? Nope. When General Synod is told 22 CDMs and numerous safeguarding and HR complaints were levelled against Bishops and Archbishops last year, simply note the number that “stepped back from their ministry pending the outcome of enquiries and resolution”. Zero is the answer. So, a hierarchy that treats its clergy with cruel-casual impunity, but makes sure its own kind and key staff have full immunity.
The CofE is not a victim of folk like Sargeant. The culture the Bishops will not want to reform reproduces versions of Sargeant in small batches. Since we know that not one person in the CofE can estimate expenditure on safeguarding to the nearest £10 million – with no checks, contracts or oversight for all the unlicensed, unaccountable, unregulated and unauthorised “consultants” and the “investigators” – we can be confident that pots of money are being made from the ineptness of episcopal oversight. Bishops will resist an audit trail: as expenditure is so huge. Meanwhile, more Sargeant’s wait in…
Quite agree. Vast amounts of money are wasted but money for the important posts cannot be found. The number of cdms should total 24, but two of mine are being ignored. I did try to file cdm against my Bishop last year, and cdm against my Rector but cannot file as the reasonable adjustments necessary under the Equality Act because I am blind have not materialised except for an attempt to pay a barrister to file a form leaving out my complaints. As the C of E is lawless, breaching the Equality Act to protect a Bishop guilty of systemic failures is only to be expected.
Fleecing London diocese of £5m is a shocking fraud, but not surprising that he got away with it. Such internal financial controls that were in place, look to have simply been overridden.
It is inconceivable that the auditors haven’t been making recommendations over many years on the controls, as this would be part of their remit.
I’m suggesting their advice has been routinely ignored.
The Trustees are responsible for the prevention and detection of fraud. They’ve been caught napping. No one is suggesting complicity in the fraud, at least not at this stage, but ignorance or incompetence is no defence. The diocesan external auditors will now be raising their estimation of risk, increasing their scrutiny (and fees) and expect more “differences” to arise in the coming years. I’m can easily imagine this being the tip of an iceberg.
A cautionary note – I know I shall be unpopular. No one should be making any categorical statements of guilt here or suggestions implying it. That decision is a matter for a judge and jury.
Of course Rowland. However, no one’s arguing that £5m didn’t go missing. The systems seem hopelessly inadequate, unless I’m missing something?
I was clearly referring to individual guilt, not the crime. One comment I have read here seems to me potentially defamatory. It’s kinder not to spell it out.
It’s true that clergy at all levels are often faced with tasks for which they are unqualified. This partly explains some of the safeguarding lapses pre-21st century. But it’s also true that the Church often discounts those who do have such expertise, especially if they seem to be outsiders or their ‘face doesn’t fit’. I and so many others have offered expertise over the years, including recently, and been ignored. It’s not easy to tell why one person’s amateur ignorance is preferred to another’s expert knowledge.
In fact the Church seems to prefer amateurism – try asking advice on a tricky situation in the parish and see what response you get. (The honourable exceptions were the Archdeacon of Macclesfield and Bishop of Stockport in my first incumbency.)
My only knowledge of business matters comes from 3 years in publishing (secretary/editorial assistant) and 4 in bookselling. Even that much has proved very useful over the years – but I don’t think it would have been necessary to teach me that appointments (especially senior appointments) ought to be made with due diligence. It ought to be obvious to anyone that references should be required and the interview panel should include people from varied skills and backgrounds.
I’d point out also, that Bp Chartres, as one of Princess Diana’s executors, should have known a fair bit about sound financial procedures.
Anyone who has been at the centre of church life knows about the network of informal power relationships at its centre. It is found even in a relatively small parish. Who cleans the church? Who counts the collection plate? And what do they “get” in return. Gift of service creates a debt of sorts, an obligation in the other direction. Advice on “higher” matters, such as decisions on starting a Family Service, start becoming shared with trusted others. One vicar I knew created his own “eldership” a body of unelected not-always-senior people to do his bidding. In return for recognition and some sort of status, they encouraged others to accept his approach. People are suckers for this.
Now multiply the above by a thousand, and you have an inkling of an understanding of how a diocese might work. In the case cited, material benefits have passed to the Head of Operations, not just in an apparent salary, but allegedly in defalcations. But outside this case, there will be many other “benefits” distributed, entirely legitimately in a sense by custom, but benefits nonetheless. Who gets free holiday accommodation courtesy of parishioners with second homes in Cornwall? The benefits flow both ways.
None of us is immune to influence from this ancient system of exchange. It’s a nightmare from an accountant’s perspective, because it is difficult to measure, and rarely gets recorded anywhere. It’s a significant off-the-books economy.
When financial resources are stretched, as they often are in Church life, the currency of expertise becomes a particularly valuable one. Set against the shortage of expertise, how do you go about assessing the quality of expertise available to you, for example in the field of property, if you have little knowledge of it yourself? And how do you assess honesty? The “Seems like a good chap” method doesn’t really cut it, particularly when the resulting advice is relied upon at scale.
One of the biggest weaknesses in the life of the Church, is the attribution of all-knowingness to bishops. Of course many will not themselves buy this fallacy. In no other field of life, except perhaps for politics, would such power reside in the hands of so few people, so poorly equipped to handle it.
As the number of volunteers in church continues to decline, it must be a relief to many clergy when someone volunteers to be PCC treasurer. A friend was in her first appointment as incumbent. A very likeable popular woman was appointed treasurer. Unfortunately she was adept at forging signatures and even producing made up auditor’s reports. Six years later, when tens of thousands of pounds had gone into her pockets, a cheque for the parish share bounced. Until then, nobody suspected a thing, even taking into account her lavish lifestyle. Tragically, when she discovered that she’d been rumbled, she took her own life. She was also defrauding other charities. I’m assuming she was very good at forgery, also her sunny helpful personality, because the truth only came out in the inquest, shocking many, including reportedly her own husband.
Very helpful story, Petra. Thanks for sharing.
Delegation is not the same as abrogation. Recognising we don’t know everything is vital of course, and it’s impossible to achieve very much in charge of an organisation, without relying on others. But managers sometimes forget that they themselves are still responsible for the the work done by assistants.
Never allow yourself sole unsupervised access to the church bank account, but insist on more than one trustee having joint sign off on payments over a certain amount. This would be an example of a simple internal control, one of many, which will protect you as much as those you delegate too. It’s simpler to rely on trust, but the examples above demonstrate how badly wrong things can get.
Incidentally fraud is difficult to detect, and harder to prove. A good control environment will help prevention and detection to some extent but won’t eliminate it. However, if you’re in charge, it will help you look less like an idiot if there is a thief at work.
Regarding expertise, I have found the more I study a subject, the less I realise I really know about it. For example, I have done a bit of plumbing, but always get a qualified and experienced plumber in for anything serious. It’s costly, but worth it.