by Richard Scorer

The ‘Independent Review into Soul Survivor’ by barristers Fiona Scolding KC and Ben Fullbrook  was published on Thursday. The report has generated some criticism from survivors: this piece (link to Scolding, Colluding or Both? My critique of the Scolding Review into Soul Survivor and Mike Pilavachi – God Loves Women (wordpress.com)  is a particularly incisive critique, and articulates some of the feelings which I know some survivors have about the review’s approach. In this piece however I want to highlight some other issues arising from this report. As I observed earlier this year, the Soul Survivor scandal has important implications for the Church of England. As the review makes clear, complaints about Pilavachi were deliberately brushed under the carpet for years, even as the CofE was telling IICSA that everything had changed. This should strike down any complacency about the state of safeguarding in the CofE. If a cover up can still happen during IICSA, how effective is the CofE’s safeguarding system in reality? On this subject, where does the report take us?

Evidentially, of course, this review was handicapped from the start.  God Loves Women raises concerns about the review’s approach to contacting and speaking with survivors – I cannot comment on these, as for the individuals I represent I acted as conduit between the reviewers and my clients. I know however that many survivors were also unwilling, understandably, to speak to a review commissioned and paid for by Soul Survivor itself.  For legal reasons, the Church of England National Safeguarding Team did not share all or even most of the information in its possession with the reviewers. The reviewers also confirm that “We have not been permitted to see Mr Pilavachi’s “Blue File” (a file held by the Bishop which acts as a personnel/HR file for the diocese and which is transferred between dioceses) because of data protection guidelines. We therefore have to rely upon what the diocese has told us about the information contained within it”. In addition, a police investigation remains ongoing. Clearly, therefore, much primary evidential material was unavailable to the reviewers. Hence, for reasons which are not necessarily the fault of the reviewers themselves, the evidential foundations on which this report are built are deficient. 

The report concludes that many if not most in the Soul Survivor leadership knew about Pilavachi’s behaviour. This is not a surprising verdict, and given the known facts any other conclusion would have been nonsensical. However, the question of who knew what and when needs more forensic analysis. There is some of this in the report, but overall the reviewers conclude that “It has not been possible for us to identify exactly who knew what and when, but we consider that those most involved in the church and its leadership would have known about Mr. Pilavachi’s behaviours towards others”. To be fair to the reviewers, it would have been difficult for them to reach definitive conclusions without seeing all the primary material. But there remains a need to properly pin down responsibility and culpability for the enabling of these shameful events (beyond the obvious primary responsibility of Pilavachi himself). This is not about trying to notch up legal ‘gotchas’. A hard analysis of who knew what and when, and what they did with that knowledge, and how they reflect on their behaviour now, is important for several reasons. Without it, those individuals who enabled Pilavachi’s behaviour can hide behind the conclusion that ‘everyone’ knew, and thus by implication everyone was at fault, whilst in effect evading personal responsibility. But it also leads onto another fundamental question:  how can Soul Survivor truly reform itself when so many of the people leading it now were also heavily involved, and some were in leadership positions, during the years when Pilavachi did these things, and was widely known to be doing them?  

To give just one example of continuity of personnel at Soul Survivor between the Pilavachi period and today, the new associate pastor at Soul Survivor, appointed in 2024, was deeply involved in the organisation prior to his ordination in 2016. Before his 2024 appointment, the Soul Survivor leadership expressed its intention to recruit from “outside the church” to bring “fresh perspectives and strengths” (see https://premierchristian.news/en/news/article/soul-survivor-watford-appoints-former-member-as-new-associate-pastor ). Given the promises of change in the Soul Survivor statement accompanying the review, I would have welcomed some discussion about this appointment and especially the apparent reversal of a promise to recruit from ‘outside the church’, as this might raise questions about the extent of commitment to change. It would also have been useful to understand what the new associate pastor feels about the handling of earlier complaints about Pilavachi’s behaviour, and how that failure informs his approach to safeguarding and his leadership of Soul Survivor now.  The question of how cultural change is achieved in an organisation afflicted by scandal when there is continuity of personnel arose repeatedly in IICSA; as well as being a fundamental problem for Soul Survivor, it also cuts across the wider Church of England, where many in the current ‘purple circle’ are implicated in previous failings. As someone said to me today, referencing Graham Cray, “there is no real action in the Church of England against Bishops who have failed. How could there be? There would be no-one left”. The report makes some specific recommendations about changes to Soul Survivor’s culture and governance, and the public statement issued by Soul Survivor seems to include a commitment to provide regular updates on the implementation of these. On this we shall see,  but crucially, how is the Church of England, or anyone else, going to monitor this? Reversion to type becomes so much easier when the media are no longer on the case. As Matt Drapper observed online, “without social media, and print media, none of this would have come to light in this way and he (Pilavachi) would likely not have been held to account in any meaningful way”. This is a very important point, and one true of so many CofE scandals, as I noted in IICSA. But the same point also has force looking forward: once the media spotlight is switched off, will past behaviours simply resurface? Absent effective oversight, this is a real risk.

However, on the question of how the CofE– provides that effective oversight, the reviewers could only go so far given their remit. The report makes some pertinent comments about the dangers of quick-fire ordination, an issue which has arisen in other CofE scandals, and about the difficulties in overseeing Bishop’s Mission orders. It emphasises the need for better diocesan oversight “particularly in respect of large churches since these have often been associated with more high profile failures of governance”. Again, it makes some specific recommendations.  However, its ‘Broader recommendations for the Church of England’ at the end of the report have a somewhat motherhood-and-apple-pie  flavour ( e.g. “Those who wish to be in communion or part of the Church of England should recognise that this comes with rights, but also responsibilities”; “An individual’s reputation or prominence must never be a reason not to challenge poor behaviours”; “The Church must continue to promote a culture where the reputation and wellbeing of its members are more important than the reputation of the organisation or any individuals within it”). These are not really ‘broader recommendations’ so much as patently unrealised aspirations.  I don’t particularly criticise the reviewers for this because a comprehensive wider analysis of where this scandal leaves the Church of England was not in their job description.  One of the people we need to hear something meaningful from about this is the CofE’s Lead Safeguarding Bishop, who so far as I am aware has remained largely silent throughout this unfolding scandal. 

However, one of the most troubling passages in the report was the suggestion (in section 4.23) that “Mr Pilavachi’s  view  was that the Church of England’s attitude to the allegations changed markedly from the point at which they reached the public domain and the press”. Whilst this may be a self serving claim, the implication that the Church of England National Safeguarding Team only started to take the allegations against Pilavachi seriously when the media got hold of them is extremely troubling. There is already widespread concern that the CoE safeguarding is  unduly influenced by reputational factors, and is not objectively applied, (for example being weaponised to settle internal scores).  We still have no detail about what the NST actually did in this case, what they unearthed, exactly what action has been taken and against whom, and whether they could plausibly act as neutral investigators given that so many prominent leaders in the CofE have Soul Survivor connections. As some members of General Synod have said, there still needs to be a proper independent inquiry into the Church of England’s failings in this case. I hope synod members will continue to press that case. There are, of course, many more points that can and will be made about this review in the coming days, but the reckoning from this awful saga is far from over.  

 Richard Scorer is Head of Abuse Law and Public Inquiries at Slater & Gordon Lawyers (UK). He acts for some of the Soul Survivor complainants